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There are innumerable histories of warfare on the market, mostly with the same format: a chronological narration of tactics and weapons, a series of changes from prehistoric times until the nuclear era. John Keegan's history of warfare is slightly different, divided more thematically than chronologically ('Stone' and 'Flesh'), and interested in all aspects of 'war'. Indeed, Keegan's great strength is the depth of his text, which critiques more than just swords and squares. The political and economic aspects of war - be they imperatives, facilitators or consequences - are critiqued, as is the mindset of soldiers (are they tribal?) and the interrelationship of different kinds of conflict with society and culture. Artillery, forts and firestorms are all present, but psychology, philosophy and empathy are just as important to this history of warfare than the theory behind firing four rounds a minute.
Moreover, one seeking a critique of a few eras of warfare will be disappointed as Keegan covers the history of war worldwide. This presents a slight problem in terms of a thorough recount of the history of warfare. It is impossible to fully critique a concept such as warfare in a few hundred pages. However, Keegan tackles this daunting task by focusing more on the themes of war and the psychology, and philosophy of war as opposed to battle statistics. This makes for a far more interesting read and allows the reader to potentially see warfare from a different perspective. More often times than not, military texts written on “history” are a conglomeration of statistics and battle recounts. Keegan proves to be keen in this regard as he discusses other facets of warfare that transcend all national boundaries.
Keegan’s text is comprised of five sections, briefly mentioned above. The first section of his text talks about the history of warfare within human history. He spends the vast majority of this part of his book refuting Clausewitzian theory that states that “war is policy by other means.” Keegan talks about the relevance of warfare in human history and how it is a mere facet of life on earth. In many ways, warfare is a force that defines us and its practitioners are the men upon which societies are built. Also, in this first part of his text, he talks about the limitations of warmarking. The second part of Keegan’s text is titled “Stone.” It is here that he discusses the interlude to fortification as a premise and integral facet of battle. It is here that Keegan discusses the reason for why men fight. He goes on to state that war is a fact of human life and writ in the nature of human’s worldwide and has been this way since the beginning of time.
In the third part of Keegan’s text entitled “Flesh,” our author discusses Armies and their composition. He moves on to discuss the importance and difference in the ways armies are maintained and kept on the cutting-edge of warfighting. It is here that Keegan discusses tactics. This is particularly interesting to me given my current thesis on the theoretical constructs of fourth generational warfare. While this text isn’t specifically geared towards any facet of fourth generational warfare, Keegan outlines the differences between the differences of tactics in the varying generations. For example, he outlines that he tactics of the first generation were that of column-and-line tactics. Second generation warfare saw the influx of concentration on indirect fires and artillery as opposed to mere infantry battles. Third generation was defined by “blitzkrieg” tactics in which the commanders’ intent was more important than adherence to the culture of military order, which predominantly governed previous generations of warfare. Fourth generation warfare is beyond the scope of this text, but for all intents and purposes, is defined by an asymmetric style of combat in which a state military battles a non-state insurgency. The tactics obliterate the front-rear lines of the traditional battlefield. The insurgency is not merely concerned with out-powering the nation state army, rather by destroying the nations’ will to fight. This generation has completely abandoned the culture of military order.
The fourth section of Keegan’s text was particularly interesting to me being a soon-to-be ordnance officer. The fourth section of his text is titled “Iron,” the interlude to logistics and supply. After reading this text, I am more convinced now that logistics are truly the most important facet of an armies’ ability to successfully wage warfare. Void of strong logistical support, an army will surely fail in battle. This is a non-negotiable fact of warfare, as Keegan notes. He lists the battle between the Athenians and Persians in 490 BC as a pristine example in which the Athenian navy proved to be invaluable at sustaining the armies’ logistics procuring the Athenian army so that they could continue combat.
The fifth part of Keegan’s text is entitled “Fire.” It is here that he mentions the importance of fire in battle and how its evolution has changed the face of battle forever. Fire was first noted as being introduced into combat by the Byzantine Empire in the middle-seventh Century. Our author moves on to discuss how the innovation of gunpowder by the Chinese truly changed battle forever. He also mentions the use of fortification with cannons as a new face of battle and how this integrally affected the way in which war was waged.
This text by John Keegan was very dense in terms of subject matter. In order to do this text justice, one would have to write 200+ pages. However, for the purpose of this brief review the five parts of Keegan’s text prove to be informative and a great resource for military strategist and historians alike. Furthermore, the most interesting facet of this text is that it looks at the history of warfare not through the lens of every other historian but through a channeled scope in which other philosophical, psychological, and technological facets are relevant and ultimately changed the ways wars have been fought for centuries. Most importantly, Keegan points out his clear refutation of Clausewitzian theory and that war is not a continuation of policy by violent means. Rather, he states that war is a universal fact of life which defines us as individuals in many ways.